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MARTIN LUTHER ON JURISPRUDENCE-
FREEDOM, CONSCIENCE, LAW
HEINRICH SCHOLLER*t
INTRODUCTION
Martin Luther, who studied law at one time, coined the expres-
sion: "Lawyers-bad Christians." Luther struggled not only against
canon law, but also against both the legally organized Catholic
Church and the state, represented by a Catholic emperor. In direct
contrast to this struggle was Luther's attachment to the sovereign
of Saxony, his encouragement of governmental support for the
Reformation, his advocacy of the caretaker function of the
state-the government seeking to guarantee obedience to the Ten
Commandments -and his opposition to violent resistance during the
Peasant War of 1525. Based on this dichotomy, which was due to the
historical situation, Rudolf Sohm formulated the thesis that a con-
tradiction exists between canon law and the Lutheran concept of
Church.1 This thesis of a contradiction between a pragmatic affirma-
tion of the law and an initially theoretical animosity toward the law
has remained through the twentieth century, hindering the
discovery of a Lutheran understanding of the law. In order to show
that an original concept of law was also the basis of the religious
Reformation, the idea of conscience and the concepts of freedom and
law, which can be understood as the basic elements of Lutheran
jurisprudence, as well as of all legal concepts, should be considered.2
THE PRE-LUTHERAN CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND LAW
The Thomist concept of conscience and freedom differentiated
between synteresis, the basic or original conscience, and conscientia,
the conscience as applied through practical reason. Witnessing, in-
vestigating, binding, accusing or excusing (testificari, instigare vel
ligare, accusare vel excusare) were, for Thomas Aquinas, attributes
of the conscientia, the conscience in action.' He saw conscience as
*Faculty of Law, University of Munich.
tTranslated by Patricia Sofroniew.
1. R. SOHM, KIRCHENRECHT, I (1918) ("The nature of canon law is in conflict
with the nature of the Church." Id. at 700).
2. See also H. SCHOLLER, FREIHEIT DES GEWISSENS (1958); H. SCHOLLER, DAS
GEWISSEN ALS GESTALT DER FREIHEIT. DAs GEWISSEN ALS SINNGESTALT UND STRUKTUR-
PRINZIP IM VERFASSUNGSRECHT, (1962); H. Scholler, Gewissen, Gesetz und Rechtsstaat,
in GEWISSEN IN DER DISKUSSlON, 406 (1976).
3. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. 1, question 79, art. 13 ("con-
scientia dicitur testificar, in quantum cognoscintus nos aliquid fecisse vel non;'....
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merely a function of the synteresis. Conscience was not a capability
or power or a physically distinct entity; rather, it was a specific
function, namely, the application of knowledge.' As the application of
knowledge (applicatio scientiae), conscientia had the function of prac-
tical reason,5 which subsumes ideas, applying knowledge to in-
dividual cases. Aquinas mentioned that conscientia was also referred
to as that which controls the spirit (spiritus corrector) and guides
the soul (paedagogus animae); however, such characteristics were for
him essentially the dictates of reason (dictamen rationis).' Conscien-
tia as the dictate of reason incorporated a goal-oriented system of
knowledge (ordo scientiae ad aliquid) and was therefore only an act
of practical reason that Aquinas also described as the affirmative or
negative judgment of practical reason (indicium rationis practicae af-
firmantis vel negantis).7
Beginning with this concept of conscience, the west ex-
perienced widespread moral and intellectual development, culminat-
ing in the American constitutional guarantees of liberty of con-
science. A complete change in the perception of the theological and
anthropological importance of conscience was the focal point of this
development. Every declaration of human rights involves the con-
cept of conscience, not as mere dictate of reason (dictamen rationis),
but rather as dictate of conscience (dictamen conscientiae). The con-
cept of a dictate of conscience first appeared in the draft of the Con-
stitution of the English Levellers in 1647: "because therein we can-
not remit or exceed a title of what our conscience dictates to be the
mind of God."8 According to this conceptualization, conscience dic-
tated "the mind of God" directly to the faithful; conscience was not
application of the law (applicatio legis) or dictate of reason (dictamen
rationis), but a means through which God's will was proclaimed to
mankind. In the later constitutions of the North American colonies,
and in documents such as the Bill of Rights, the guarantee of liberty
instigare vel ligare, in quantum iudicamus aliquid esse agendum vel non...; accusare
vel excusare, in quantum cognosciumus nos bene vel male fecisse").
4. Id. ("Conscientia non est potentia, nec habitus; sed est actus, scilicet ap-
plicatio scientiae").
5. Id. at art. 13, reply objection 3 ("conscientia est actus synteresis idio
quandoque ponitur pro ea").
6. Id. at art. 13, reply objection 1 ("conscientia dicitur spiritus corrector et
paedagogus animae, id est, dictamen rationis).
7. Id. at art. 13. ("conscientia definiri potest iudicium rationis practicae affir-
mantis vel negantis aliquid circa res particulares").
8. The Agreement of the People, 28 October 1647, reprinted in G. Jellinek,
Die Erkldrung der Menschen-und Burgerrechte, VOLKERRECHTLICHE BEITRAGE, Bd I
H. 3, 78 (1919).
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of conscience usually was referred to as the liberty to worship God
according to the dictates of one's own conscience, or, as it is ex-
pressed in the Constitution of New Hampshire:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience
and reason and no subject shall be hurt, molested or re-
strained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping
God in the manner and reason most agreeable to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession,
sentiments or persuasion ....
This concept of conscience eventually led to the idea of the
sovereignty of the people. Natural law theories cannot be considered
as the origin of the idea of the sovereignty of the people because
philosophical or natural law theories are not capable of creating
groups in society that undertake the realization of natural law ideas.
On the contrary, the construction of a temporal order emerges by
way of analogy to the metaphysical-religious ideas of social groups.0
Organized groups stood behind Browne, Williams and the Baptists,
but not behind Althusius, Grotius or Pufendorf, in whose philosophi-
cal systems the religious movements took the sublime but insubstan-
tial form of a natural law of reason."
The concept of human rights, closely connected with the new
concept of conscience, originated in the revolutionary churches of
England long before Pufendorf. Their new theory of the soul, which
was similar to the concept of conscience developing in the theology
of sects, was initially, however, incapable of establishing churches."
At first, the concept of conscience had no effect beyond the forma-
tion of sects. However, this theology of the sects eventually led to
the establishment of new churches, as well as to new constitutional
9. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 3 (1784). See Z. GIACOMETTI, QUELLEN ZUR
GESCHICHTE DER TRENNUNG VON STAAT UND KIRCHE 684 (1926). The same definition of
liberty of conscience: "according to the dictates of the conscience," can be found in the
following constitutions: MASS. CONST. art 11 (1780); N.J. CONST. art. XVIII (1776); N.Y.
CONST. art XXXVIII (1777); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art III (1777); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16
(1776).
10. See A. DEMPF, SACRUM IMPERIUM 57 (2d ed. 1954).
11. H. TROELTSCH, AUFSATZE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE UND
RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE 305 (1925). Welzel's deduction of the American human rights
theory from Pufendorf's natural law theory is unconvincing, although Pufendorfs ideas
did influence the American preacher, Whight. H. Welzel, Ein Kapitel aus der
Erklarung der Menschenrechte, in RECHTSPROBLEMS IN STAAT UND KIRCHE. FESTSCHRIFT
FOR R. SMEND IN DER REIHE DER GOTTINGER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN STUDIEN, 387
(1952).
12. A. DEMPF, supra note 10, at 57.
1981]
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concepts. Thus, the idea of sovereignty of the people had its roots in
the new concept of conscience and can be understood as a transfer-
ence of religious individualism to the political level, as an analogy to
the doctrine of a general priesthood. Troeltsch characterized reli-
gious individualism as follows: "This religious individualism is the op-
posite of all ecclesiastical authoritative religion. It acknowledges on-
ly one authority, God and one's own conscience, through which God
speaks.""3 Calvinists and Baptists equated Christian freedoms with
civil rights and Christian communities with civil communities, sug-
gesting the transfer of the metaphysical principle of the community
of the faithful (communio sanctorum) to the civil community." Hence,
the principle of self-government within Christian communities, when
transferred to the political sphere, led to the principle of the
sovereignty of the people. 5 This doctrine of self-government was in-
herent in the Reformatory churches' underlying tenet of an anti-
hierarchical general priesthood. This general priesthood had its
basis in the significance of conscience as the direct forum for God's
word, without the mediation of historical or traditional cult institu-
tions. The question of the role that the concept of conscience played
within Reformation dogma is therefore the central problem (punc-
turn saliens) in evaluating the sociological, political and legal effects
of the religious revolutionary movements of the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries. The effect of the new concept of conscience was
not confined to the practical and theoretical realization of the idea of
the sovereignty of the people. Many modern fundamental constitu-
tional principles, such as freedom of religion, separation of powers,
and separation of church and state (laicism), can be attributed to the
development of the concept of conscience. Within Protestantism not
all movements, denominations, and sects contributed to the forma-
tion of the new concept of conscience to the same extent. On the
contrary, a vast gradation can be found, based on differences in per-
sonal theology, historical connections with traditional orders, and
the status of the church or sect within the state.
LUTHER'S CONCEPT OF CONSCIENCE AND FREEDOM
From a sociological viewpoint, Lutheranism played the smallest
role in the development of new social formations, although Luther's
13. H. TROELTSCH, supra note 11, at 220.
14. K. BARTH, CHRISTENGEMEINDE UND BORGERGEMEINDE (1946).
15. H. WEINGARTEN, DIE REVOLUTIONSKIRCHEN ENGLANDS 288 (1868) ("The
right of each religious community to self-determination and self-government was the
basis of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, which they introduced to modern
political consciousness").
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new concept of conscience was the crucial impetus for the develop-
ment of the concept of the sovereign conscience as it was later
found in the Baptist-influenced Calvinism of the Netherlands, Eng-
land, and North America. Within Calvinist and Baptist theology, the
dogma of predestination and the doctrine of the continuing revela-
tion of God, can be regarded as significant shifts of emphasis from
the word of God as it is revealed in the Scripture to the word of
God as it is revealed by conscience. For Max Weber, this shift was
the basis of Calvinism's influence on economics and business
affairs."6 According to Weber, free enterprise and the resulting
capitalism are the economic analog of religious individualism. Sim-
ilarly, the sovereignty of the people can be regarded as the political
analog of the general priesthood of the faithful, based on the sover-
eignty of conscience.
In Luther's dogma, however, conscience is not a direct and ab-
solute entity. God's word as it is revealed in the Scripture is only
absolute within the context of the Scripture. Conscience itself does
not have an absolute freedom because the word of God as revealed
in conscience has a subjective (ie., indirect and relative) determi-
nant.17 According to Barth, Protestantism cannot be equated with
political or economic freedom, as this would constitute a confusion of
the Reformation with humanistic individualism.18 Nevertheless,
Luther's concept of conscience was the basis for a number of new
political social structures, although only Calvinism subsequently
achieved a systematic organization of society.
For Luther, conscientia was not an application of the law or
knowledge (applicatio legis vel scientiae) as it was for Aquinas.
Rather it was the mystical sphere in which a gigantic struggle for
the redemption of the soul took place, in which the condemning law
(lex mortis), the wrath of God (ira Dei), and the powers of tempta-
tion19 raged against sinners.' Conscientia was the ultimate tempta-
tion (ultima tentatio), the theological prison (carcer theologicus)
16. M. WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR RELIGIONSSOZIOLOGIE, Bd. 1: DIE
PROTESTANTISCHE ETHIK UND DER GEIST DES KAPITALISMUS 158-61 (1920).
17. K. BARTH, DOGMATIK I: PROLEGOMENA ZUR CHRISTLICHEN DOGMATIK 388,
409, (1927). The new Catholic interpretation of conscience avoids intellectualism. Auer,
Das Gewissen al Mitte der pereonalen Existenz (lecture at the meeting of the
Catholic Academy in Nfirnberg, Bavaria, April 2-3, 1960).
18. K. BARTH, supra note 17, at 389.
19. JACOB, DER GEWISSENSBEGRIFF IN DER THEOLOGIE LUTHERS, BEITRAGE ZUR
HISTORISCHEN THEOLOGIE, Bd. 4, (1929).
20. Id. at 30. LUTHER. PREDIGTEN DES JAHRES 1528, Weimarer Ansyabe
[hereinafter cited as WA] XXVII, 152, 4.
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through which the voice of God spread fear and mortal terror
(tremor mortis). As such, conscience was a horrible thing (tenerrima
res).2 1 It is therefore understandable that, for Luther, freedom of
conscience was not as important as the conscience of freedom (cons-
cientia libertatis), a freedom from the condemning law and the
wrath of God which raged in the conscience. He found this con-
science of freedom. in the justification based on faith, in "the inner
being of conscientia in the primeval verbum.' '2 Only from this point
of view, in order to ensure the conscience of freedom, did he also
postulate freedom of conscience from man-made or church statutes
that separate man from God.23 According to Luther, laws that imposed
rights and ceremonies that demanded action (leges operum et
ceremoniarum) and the laws and traditions (Jura et traditiones) of
the constitutional legal Roman Church were a threat to the con-
science of freedom. 2' Thus, the Lutheran concept of conscience is not
in accordance with the synteresis or conscientia of Thomism; rather,
it displays certain characteristics of German mysticism and is
reminiscent of Abelard's doctrine.' A strong attachment to the
Scriptures saved orthodox Lutheranism from the religious in-
dividualism that for others resulted from this new concept of con-
science.
Spiritualists,"' on the other hand, showed a marked shift of em-
phasis from the objective authority of the Scripture to the authority
21. For Luther conscience dominated over the sacrament. Luther, Ein Ser-
mon von der Beichte und dem Sakrament, PREDIGTEN DES JAHRES 1524; WA XV, 485,
20 (1524) ("So ist nun viel besser, das man von der beycht und vom sacrament bleybe,
denn das man ungerne hynzu gehe, so bleyben doch die gewissen ungemartert'7.
22. J. HECKEL, Lex Charitatis, ABHANDLUNGEN DER BAYERISCHEN AKADEMIE
DER WISSENSCHAFTEN, PHIL-HIsT. K1. N.F. 1953, H. 3, p. 61 n.416; Luther, De Capt.
BabyL EccL WA VI, 537, 15.
23. De Votis Monsticis Martini Lutheri Sententia 1521, WA VIII, 609, 38.
("Potest enim Christianus omnes omnium hominum leges, ritus mores observare et
sese eis accommodare, modo non sint adversus divina mandata, nec in eis fiduciam
conscientiae ponat. Conscientia enim Christo et Christus conscientiae, secreta huius
sponsi et sponsae cubilia nemo tentet." Id. at WA VI, 535, 34; 537, 19).
24. Luther, De Capt. Babyl Ecc 1520, WA VI, 535, 34 to 536, 7; 537, 12
(1520).
25. W. WINDELBAND, GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, 243 (1892).
Abelard (1079-1122), one of the most important personalities of early
scholasticism, was condemned by the Synodes of Soissons (1121) and Sens (1140). He
emphasized the function of the Holy Ghost as the "soul of the world" (Wetseele),
stressed the importance of individual moral consciousness, and developed a theory of
the Trinity that questioned the equality of the Son and the Holy Ghost with the
Creator. His standpoint was psychological, based on an ethical understanding of the
human being and an emphasis on conscience.
26. N. PAULUS, PROTESTANTISMUS UND TOLERANZ IM 16. JAHRHUNDERT 144
(1911); A. HEGLER, GEIST UND SCHRIFT BEI SEBASTIAN FRANCK 260 (1892) ("The faithful
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 3
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of a subjective and ultimately sovereign conscience. For example,
Thamer, a professor of theology in Marburg and an advocate of the
Lutheran concept of justification, rejected the notion of the bind-
ingness of Scripture, and demanded that the preaching of the Gospel
be based solely on conscience." Thomas Browne, the founder of
English Deism, rejected all dogmas and denominations in his Religio
Medici; for him, conscience was the only true guide.28 Politically im-
portant interpretations of conscience, in the sense of a mystic and
baptist inner light, can be found in the writings of Fox, Barclay, and
Penn.'
STATE AND LAW
The union of church and executive power was disrupted and
modified by the Reformation. It is difficult to say whether the sep-
aration of the ecclesiastical and the temporal power was inherent
in Luther's theory of two kingdoms (Regimentenlehre)3" or his doc-
trine of justification, or whether it emerged later as the necessary
consequence of his struggles against the Roman Church. The rejec-
tion of all mediating influences between God and man-the repudia-
tion of a legally organized church-seems to be contained in his con-
cept of justification sola fide (only through faith)." Generated
through the word and the sacrament, the belief in the redemption of
Christ was not only necessary but also sufficient to justify the
faithful and to unite them within the community, the mystical body
of Christ. Once Luther rejected apostolic succession and the "power
of the keys" as prerequisites for justification, he had to entrust the
has in himself a 'kingdom of conscience,' in which he possesses all things. Conscience
may not tolerate a mortal master, may not be oppressed and vexed by human im-
peratives . . ." Id. at 99).
These spiritualists included Sebastian Franck, Johann Campanus, Sebastian
Castellio, Kasper Schwenkfeld and others.
27. Koehler, Theobald Thamer, in RGG V Sp. 1083, 702.
Other extreme advocates of this concept of conscience include the politically in-
significant Conscientiarii in Germany, Thomas Browne, and Quaker leaders Fox,
Barclay, and Penn.
28. H. WEINGARTEN, supra note 15, at 310 n.4; BROWNE, RELIGIO MEDICI,
("Totam pharsaliam in pectore tumultuantem sentio, affectum contra affectum, ra-
tionem contra fidem, fidem contra diabolum et contra haec omnia conscientiam").
29. H. WEINGARTEN, supra note 15. at 206.
30. The theory of two kingdoms, Regimentenlehre, is based on Tyonius,
whose theory was modified by Augustinus in the Civitas Dei. A. DEMPF, supra note 10,
at 121. The German contributions with regard to Augustinus are discussed by Hans
Maier in Klassiker des Politischen Denkens I 87 (1968).
31. R. SOHM, supra note 1, at 481 ("Leave us the gospel and a free conscience,
in order that we do not have to consider ecclesiastical law as law").
1981]
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administration of the word and the sacrament either to the religious
community or to the sovereign. Either option served the same pur-
pose: the rejection of the legally organized church as an hierarchic
entity.
Lutheranism, which, like the Reformed Church, was based on
the general priesthood of the faithful, entrusted the sovereign with
the responsibility for the visible church (ecclesia visifilis" thereby
establishing the territorial sovereign as high bishop (summus
episcopus). Luther left this task to Melanchton.' Due to a dislike for
all legal formulation, Luther did not want to establish a new ec-
clesiastical order. Melanchton conveyed the guardianship over the
first table (custodia primus tabulae) to the sovereign as the most prom-
inant member of the church (principuum membrum ecclesiae). In-
stead of being dependent on a universal, legally-organized church,
the faithful were now dependent on a territorial state. Attempts
were made to avoid the danger of a religious dependency by deny-
ing significance to external manifestations of the church, thereby
reducing the "real" church to an invisible spiritual church over
which the state could not exercise power."
Within theological literature, Luther's doctrine of justification
has repeatedly been identified with the postulate of freedom of con-
science. 5 Luther's words at the Diet in Worms clearly demonstrate
that his doctrinal stance against the Church was based on his own
conscience. But did Luther emphasize freedom of conscience? Was it
not, on the contrary, merely a means of giving the people access to
his new doctrine?" Luther's own statements are controversial. The
political result of his reformatory work was the formal principle of
separation of powers37 in the spiritual and temporal realms, and the
material principle of freedom of conscience." When, based on his
32. G. SCHWANHAUBER, DAS GESETZGEBUNGSRECHT DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE
UNTER DEM EINFLUB DES LANDESHERRLICHEN KIRCHENREGIMENTES IM 16. JAHRHUNDERT
(1957).
33. J Heckel, Melanchton und das heutige Staatskirchenrecht, in Um RECHT
UND GERECHTIGKEIT. FESTGABE FOR KAUFMANN ZUM 70, 83 (1950).
34. Regarding the reformatory concept of church and theory of conscience see
F. Foerster, Fragen zu Luthers Kirchenbegriff aus der Gedankenwelt seines Alters,
FESTSCHRIFT FOR J. KAFTAN 102 (1920); F. KATTENBUSCH. DIE DOPPELSCHICHTIGKEIT IN
LUTHERS KIRCHENBEGRIFF 197, 314, 318 (1927-28).
35. Hoffmann, Reformation und Gewissensfreiheit, in Aus DER WELT DER
RELIGION. RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE REIHE, HEFT 18, (1932).
36. K. LEESE, GEISTESMACHTE UND SEINSGEWALTEN 61 (1946).
37. G. TORNVALL, GEISTIGES UND WELTLICHES REGIMENT BEI LUTHER 109 (1947).
38. Conscientia libertatis not libertatis conscientiae was the concern of the
Reformation. J. HECKEL, supra note 22, at 61 n. 416.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/3
MARTIN LUTHER ON JURISPRUDENCE
own conscience, Luther burned the papal bull together with volumes
of the Corpus luris Canonici, he denied the existence of canon law
but not of the legal system as such. However, at that time canon law
was a nearly inseparable part of the complex legal system.
The rejection of canon law resulted in the denial not only of the
divine law (ius divinum) but also of all ecclesiastical, legislative and
judicial authority, for the sake of freedom of conscience. As a result,
all ecclesiastical power was united in territorial governmental in-
stitutions (consistories or ministries) that were established for this
purpose. 9 Under the principles of the invisible church (ecclesia in-
visibilis), the dogmatic antithesis of the concept of an invisible God
(Deus absconditus), it was believed that the church as a community
of the faithful under the leadership of Christ could be saved from
the state, the damned (massa damnata) under the leadership of the
devil, thus obtaining a guarantee of freedom of conscience."v In real-
ity, the theoretical separation of these two realms did not function
well, as the state could exercise both legal and de facto power over
the church. The state had the power to care for religion and the ex-
traordinary power to change the religion of the country by law (ius
reformandi). The Reformation thus promoted territorialism, while at
the same time authorizing the state to exercise religious powers
over the individual." The domination of the individual by the state
that had developed during the Middle Ages was by no means inter-
rupted by the Reformation. Freedom of conscience and religion were
not achieved prior to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).
The modern concept of law and state was defined in a limiting
way by the Reformation concept of the new church. Although it is
not within the scope of this article to determine whether Luther
acknowledged the existence of divine law (ius divinum) or natural
law (ius naturale), by limiting the state in defining the church, he did
influence the definition of state and law. However, the absence of a
systematic natural law doctrine should not be interpreted as ap-
proval of an omnipotent governmental power.'2
39. Whereas with the young Luther the order of the Church over external af-
fairs was still the concern of the ecclesia universalis, in the Church orders of the 16th
century a transfer to the temporal powers (translatio ad regnum terrenum) took place.
J. HECKEL, INITIA IuRis 24, 42; G. SCHWANHAUBER, supra note 32, at 21.
40. G. TORNVALL, supra note 37, at 109, 114.
41. In the Baptist sects, the rejection of the conscience-binding power of law,
leads to the rejection of all executive power and to anarchism. G. Holstein, Geschichte
der Staatsphilosophie, in HANDBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE, STAAT UND GESCHICHTE 75 (1934).
42. Heckel has demonstrated that this interpretation is erroneous. J. HECKEL,
INITIA JuRA 52. See also note 49 infra; F. X. ARNOLD, ZUR FRAGE DES NATURRECHTS
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Can it be concluded that canon law is functionally dependent
upon the concept of church? If so, it can be maintained that, by the
same token, state law is dependent upon the concept of state. The
Reformation gave us a dualistic concept of the state. On the one
hand the state determines the external order of the church, an ob-
jective moral order imposed by the sovereign power over the
church. On the other hand, the internal order of thoughts and con-
science, by guaranteeing a sphere of freedom, does not fall under
state domination. 3 The freedom guaranteed in the Ailgemeines
Preussisches Landrecht (the Prussian civil law), implicit in concepts
like "God" and "divine matter," is not freedom from the state, but
freedom in the state." This sphere of individual freedom must not
be understood as a constraint on the functions and active force of
the state.'5 A dualistic concept of the state that distinguishes social
and individualistic spheres of belief is the basis of all modern con-
stitutions that bind the executive power to the maintenance of an in-
dividual sphere of fundamental liberties and values."
Luther's "religious anarchism"' 7 extended only to certain parts
of canon law, but many Spiritualists" went further. Luther's concept
of conscience was by all means bound to the word of God and thus
BEI MARTIN LUTHER 75 (1937); K. HOLL, 1 GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR KIR-
CHENGESCHICHTE, Luther 210 (1921) ("On the contrary Luther raises natural conscience
into the sphere of a christian one"). Holl also rejected Troeltsch's interpretation of an
analogy between Christian and civil freedom. H. TROELTSCH, SOZIALLEHRE 496; J.
HECKEL, INITIA JURIS 52. See also note 49 infra.
43. F. Valjavec, Das W6llnersche Religionsedikt 1788, in ZWISCHEN POLITIK
UND WISSENSCHAFT, FESTSCHRIFT FOR SCHREIBER, HIST. JAHRBUCH DER GORRES-
GESELLSCHAFT, 391 (1953).
44. Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht, Tit. 11 TH II § 1 (1794) ("The ideas
of the citizens of the state concerning God and divine matter, faith and inner worship,
cannot be the subject of compelling laws"); § 2 ("Each citizen must have complete liber-
ty of conscience and faith").
45. R. SMEND, VERFASSUNG UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT 162 (1928).
46. W. HAMEL, DIE BEDEUTUNG DER GRUNDRECHTE IM SOZIALEN RECHTSSTAAT
32 (1957).
47. Luther, De. Capt. BabyL EccL PraeL 1529, WA VI, 536, 7 ("Dico itaque: ne-
que Papa neque Episcopus neque ullus hominum habet ius minutae syllabae consti-
tuendae super Christianum hominem, nisi id fiat eiusdem consensu"). "Pro hac dum-
taxat clamo libertate et conscientia, damoque fidenter, Christianis nihil uflo iure posse
imponi legum, sive ab hominibus sive ab angelis, nisi quantum volent" liberi enim
sumus ab omnibus. Quod si quae imponuntur, sic ferenda sunt, ut libertatis conscien-
tia sacra sit .. " Id. at WA VI, 537, 12.
48. The following representatives of various Spiritualistic movements within
the Reformation deserve mention: Sebastian Franck, Jakob Bohme, Sebastian
Costellio, Acontius, Nickolaus Zur Kinden, Dirck Coornheert, and John Milton. K.
LEESE, DER PROTESTANTISMUS IM WANDEL DER ZEIT 14 (1941).
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to an objective order (capta conscientia in verbis Dei), while
Spiritualists acknowledged an inner light as the only binding order.
They therefore rejected the Bible as an objective norm.
HECKEL'S DISCOVERY OF A GENUINE LUTHERAN CONCEPT OF LAW
A re-examination of the significance of Luther's Reformation
doctrine of law and government was initiated by the works of
Johannes Heckel. In a preliminary study Heckel formulated the
basic idea that canon law is in a strict sense a humanistic, but not a
temporal, law. He subsequently developed and expanded his ideas in
Lex Charitatis, first published in 1953.' 9 The heated discussions
which followed only served to strengthen Heckel in his opinion. As
the most important work on canon law after World War II, Lex
Charitatis attracted wide attention. The essays of Paul Althaus,
Franz Lau, and Siegfried Grundmann are of particular significance."
Althaus sketched the problem aptly as follows: "Johannes Heckel's
extensive investigation of the place of law in Martin Luther's
theology promotes and earns the collective attention of theology. It
is of interest to us not only as an historical achievement, as the first
comprehensive attempt to present a system of Luther's teachings
concerning law, but more than this, it questions the relationship be-
tween faith and law ... ."" Heckel's book is a supplement to Karl
Barth's Justification and Law. While Luther's work did not answer
Barth's question whether law plays a role for the freedom of Chris-
tians, Heckel found an answer through a new interpretation of
Luther. Luther became the principal witness for the christological
foundation of law and state, a view shared by Barth.
The focus of Heckel's new interpretation was Luther's doctrine
of kingdom and reign. According to Heckel, the doctrine of reign is a
part of the two kingdoms doctrine, that is, God controls and rules in
49. The second edition by his son Martin has an unchanged text. Only the
references were updated with extensive supplementary entries. The new edition
covers a series of contributions from Heckel's work, especially: Im Irrgarten der Zwei-
Reiche-Lehre Luthers, at 317; Kirche und Kirchenrecht nach der Zwei-Reiche-Lehre,
at 354; Die Entfaltung der Zwei-Reiche-Lehre als Reichsund Regimentslehre, at 410.
The number of annotations in the Lex Charitatis remained unchanged.
50. P. Althaus, Luthers Lehre von den beiden Reichen im Feuer der Kritik,
in REICH GOTTES UND WELT 105 (H. SCHREY ED. 1969); Die beiden Reiche bei Luther.
Bemerkungen zu Johannes Heckels "Lex Charitatis", id. at 517; F. Lau, Leges
Charitates. Drei Fragen an Johannes Heckel id. at 528; S. Grundmann, Die Lehre von
den Zwei Reichen und ihre Bedeutung far die Grindung des Kirchenrechts in der
Sicht von Johannes Heckel, id. at 557.
51. P. Althaus, supra note 50, at 105.
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both kingdoms, the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of the Devil.
A Christian is not a citizen of both kingdoms, but only a citizen of
the Kingdom of God, without any alternative. However, the evil in
the Kingdom of the Devil is functionally the reign of the left hand of
God. The result of the dualism of the two kingdoms doctrine and the
reign doctrine, is a dualistic concept of law. The doctrine of the posi-
tive divine church law, which came into existence in Germany for
the first time after 1933, was based on this dualism. Canon law in
the narrower sense is, however, human law, even though it is not a
secular law. In place of obedience to the authorities, there is the
love of Christians for each other. This love is the foremost right to
be found in the common life of Christians; therefore, the idea that
the church republic is based only on the law of love (republica ec-
clesiastica unica lege charitatis instituta est) should be fundamental
to all temporal church constitutions. Heckel's work is thus an in-
valuable part of contemporary Lutheran views of church-state rela-
tions.
THE ERROR OF PROTESTANTISM AS A CULTURAL MOVEMENT
The discrepancy between the norm of law and the concept of
law was very evident in the concept of freedom of conscience. For
modern Kulturprotestantismus (Protestantism as a cultural move-
ment), freedom of conscience was the original dogma of the Reforma-
tion, but the dogma had its roots in Liberalism and the Enlighten-
ment and was just as unlutheran as it was uncalvinistic. Nineteenth
century theological literature reveals that, within Protestant dogma,
liberty of conscience became the central tenet that determined the
existence or non-existence of the Protestant Church, even though
the freedom of conscience of that time did not imply more than the
legal guarantee of domestic devotion. Baur expressed it in the fol-
lowing manner: "What is referred to as liberty of faith and con-
science and the unalienable right that the Reformation bestowed
upon mankind, is only a popular expression for an intellectual auto-
nomy. It is identical to the principle of subjectivity, an absolute self-
consciousness of human thinking liberated from an authoritarian
faith. Protestantism is the principle of subjective freedom, of liberty
of faith and conscience-of autonomy, in contrast to the heteronomy
of the Catholic concept of church."'52
52. F. BAUR, DIE EPOCHEN DER KIRCHLICHEN GESCHICHTSSCHREIBUNG 257 (1852).
Baur gives the following definition of the principle of Protestantism: "It comprises the
Protestant doctrine of the Church, the concept of the true Church, which it professes
and what it teaches about the relationship between the visible and the invisible
Church, the highest principle on which Protestantism is based is the principle of
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Baur was already clearly influenced by Hegel's legal and
religious philosophy, although the principle of freedom of conscience
does not require a Hegelian subordination of individual freedom to
the collective freedoms. The Reformation's more religious connota-
tion of freedom of conscience was lost. However, others continued to
develop the idea of freedom of conscience as the central concept of
Protestantism. For Biedermann, for instance, freedom of research
and thinking was absolutely essential to obtaining the final goal of
Protestantism.' For Hundeshagen, the Reformation was not a pro-
test of the intellectual genius against intellectual compulsion, but a
protest of the moral conscience against compulsion
(Gewissenszwang).5' According to Schenkel, freedom of conscience
and right of conscience (Gewissensrecht) were fundamental laws of
Protestantism.55 From Schleiermacher" to Harnack,57 many examples
can be found in theology which document freedom of conscience as
the basic principle of Protestantism. In the nineteenth century,
Kulturprotestantismus was thought to be the legitimate successor
of the Reformation, without the realization that the postulates of
nineteenth century idealistic German philosophy (of, e.g., Hegel)
were unwittingly being ascribed to the Reformators.
Troeltsch was the first to challenge the ideals of Kultur-
protestantismus. More intensive research on Luther and the result-
freedom of religion and conscience." DER GEGENSATZ DES KATHOLIZISMUS UND PRO-
TESTANTISMUS NACH DEN PRINZIPIEN UND HAUPTDOGMEN DER BEIDEN LEHRBEGRIFFE 401.
53. A. BIEDERMANN, CHRISTLICHE DOGMATIK I 342 (1868).
54. K. HUNDESHAGEN, DER DEUTSCHE PROTESTANTISMUS, SEINE VERGANGENHEIT
UND SEINE HEUTIGEN LEBENSFRAGEN IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DER GESAMTEN NATIONALENT-
WICKLUNG, BELEUCHTET VON EINEM DEUTSCHEN THEOLOGEN 27 (1847).
55. D. SCHENKEL, LUTHER IN WORMS UND WITTENBERG 186 (1870) ("Liberty of
conscience is the fundamental right of Protestantism and it must be viewed as a
severe tarnish of this fundamental right, when later within the Protestant Church the
consciences were bound by human formulas, the so-called dogmatic foundations, by tak-
ing an oath on them").
56. F. SCHLEIERMACHER, U0BER DIE RELIGION, ZWEITE REDE 32 (1799); F.
SCHLEIERMACHER, ZWEITES SENDSCHREIBEN OBER SEINE GLAUBENSLEHRE AN DR. LOCKE
AUS DEM JAHRGANG 1829 DER THEOLOGISCHEN STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN: SAMTLICHE
WERKE, 1. ART., II 617 (1836).
57. E. Harnack, Religi&er Glaube und Freie Forischung, in WISSEN UND
LEBEN 250 (1911).
58. H. TROELTSCH, AUFSATZE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE UND
RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE (1925); H. Troeltsch, Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche
in der Neuzeit, in KULTUR UND GEGENWART, I, part IV, 1, p. 431 (1909); H. TROELTSCH,
SOZIALLEHREN DER CHRISTLICHEN KIRCHEN UND GEMEINSCHAFTEN; H. TROELTSCH, DIE
BEDEUTUNG DES PROTESTANTISMUS FOR DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER MODERNEN WELT (1906). K.
Holl and his follower Hirsch referred to Troeltsch's ideas as outdated; however, they
are still of great importance to historians.
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ing Luther renaissance led to the realization that the concept of
freedom of conscience, as it was understood during the period of the
Enlightenment, was not the central dogma of the Reformation. Quite
possibly, this concept was not a part of the Reformatory dogmas at
all, but an historical consequence of the Schism. However, this did
not lead to the rejection of the concept of freedom of conscience as
the basic principle of Protestantism, but merely to a more critical
approach toward the Reformators 9
This theological excursus was necessary to demonstrate the
divergent meanings attached to the concept of freedom of conscience
in the humanities and jurisprudence. Beginning with the theological
and philosophical systems of the Enlightenment, the concept of
freedom of conscience underwent a further mutation, until, by the
middle of the nineteenth century, it became a political slogan with
anticlerical and, later, antichristian connotations. In the Vormarz
and the parliamentary debates of the Frankfurt National Assembly
of 1848-49, the principle of freedom of conscience became a postulate
of church policy, with the consequence of a complete separation of
church and state. In the debates over the fundamental rights in the
Frankfurt Paulskirche (a church that served as a meeting place for
the German parliament), fierce anticlerical attacks can be found that
demanded the abolition of the Church, based on the principle of
freedom of conscience. To achieve this goal, the separation of church
and state and the abolition of mandatory religious instruction in
public schools were demanded. Characteristic of these antireligious
tendencies are the contributions of two delegates to the Paulskirche
debates.' "The Church as Church must disappear, as an external
power, as a power over conscience ... In one word, the Church pro-
vided with external powers hampers the liberty of conscience;
59. H. LANG, MARTIN LUTHER 164 (1870) ("The religious struggle of today is
plainly a struggle of intellectual freedom against Lutheranism"). A. RITSCHL, FESTREDE
AM 4. SAKULARTAGE DER GEBURT MARTIN LUTHERS VON 1887, 17, 18 ("It is in strong con-
trast to the effects of the powerful spiritual impulse which emanated from Luther, that
the guiding idea, namely freedom of conscience as liberty of conscience from the guilt
towards God and therewith the idea of a spiritual domination of the world, was not
held in esteem and clarity, as it should have been expected").
60. C. Vogt, in F. WIGARD, BERICHTE OBER DIE VERHANDLUGEN DER DEUTSCHEN
CONSTITUIERENDEN NATIONALVERSAMMLUNG ZU FRANKFURT A.M., 3. Bd. 1668 (1848)
("Gentlemen, I am for the separation of the Church from the state; but only under the
condition that in principle that what is referred to as Church, be destroyed. (Commo-
tion) .... Gentlemen, for me every Church is deterrant for civilization. Every Church
because it wants dogmatic formulas, because it wants faith, hinders the free develop-
ment of human spirit").
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freedom of thought is not possible in such a Church.""1 The draft of
the fundamental rights by the Frankfurt National Assembly in the
Paulskirche consequently acknowledged the separation of church
and state, although other motives besides anticlerical ones con-
tributed to this decision. Catholic delegates and representatives of
Kulturprotestantismus also voted in favor of the separation.2
Kulturprotestantismus saw in the separation of church and state the
necessary guarantee of the concept of freedom of conscience, and
therefore approved of this separation because freedom of conscience
as the highest dogma was more important than the continuation of
the Holy Alliance of throne and altar." The separation of church and
state can therefore rightly be regarded as a legal guarantee of the
jurisprudential principle of freedom of conscience.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING
OF THE LUTHERAN CONCEPT OF LAW
The process of the rejection of an external authority of the
church underwent various stages of development, from the Lutheran
concept and the reformed doctrines of the Calvinists to the religious
anarchism of the Spiritualists." The spiritual concept of church
within Lutheran orthodoxy included the authority of the state-in
the form of a monarchy. Conflict with the state could be avoided only
by spiritualizing the church.65 The Calvinistic-Reformatory com-
munities were based on the concept of a visible church and on the
principle of an externally organized general priesthood. On the basis
of this doctrine, a democratically organized church was established
61. S. Jordan, in WIGARD, supra note 60, at 1646.
62. R. LEMPP, DIE FRAGE DER TRENNUNG VON KIRCHE UND STAAT IM
FRANKFURTER PARLAMENT 27 (1913); K. ROTHENBOCHER, DIE TRENNUNG VON KIRCHE UND
STAAT (1908).
63. T. Mayer-Maly, Zur Sinngebund von Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit in
der Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 5 OSTERREICHISCHES ARCHIV FOR KIR-
CHENRECHT 238, 244 (1954); T. MAYER-MALY, Die Grundrechte des religi6sen Lebens in
der 6sterreichischen Verfassungsgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, id. at 38.
64. H. TROELTSCH, supra note 11, at 305.
65. Against the recommendation of the Danish royal preacher, Hektor Gott-
fried Masius, who described Lutheranism as being especially monarchophile,
Thomasius protested in his Deutsche Monatsschrift.
The importance of Luther's theory of two kingdoms for today's problems is
discussed by H. SCHREY, LUTHERS LEHRE VON DEN ZwEI REICHEN UND IHRE BEDEUTUNG
FOR DIE WELTANSCHAUUNGSSITUATION DER GEGENWART 101 (1956). See also E. WOLF,
DIE "LUTHERISCHE LEHRE" VON DEN ZWEI REICHEN IN DER GEGENWARTIGEN FORSCHUNG
142 (1958-59); E. KINDER, LUTHERS ABLEITUND DER GEISTLICHEN UND WELTLICHEN
"OBRIGKErr" AUS DEM 4. GEBOT 221 (1959). K. HAENDLER, LUTHERS ZWEI-REICHE-LEHRE
UND IHRE GEGENWARTSBEDEUTUNG, 242 (1964).
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with the help of elected clergymen and teachers. This democrati-
cally-organized community inevitably came into conflict with the
monarchistic state, since a peaceful coexistence did not seem possi-
ble between two such heterogenous social structures." Added to
that, the monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries re-
tained many clerical privileges and powers that were in direct con-
trast to the doctrine of the general priesthood of the faithful. The
Calvinist church thus laid the groundwork for the rebellion against
monarchy.
Especially in France, the monarehomachs fought for the aboli-
tion of the monarchy for religious reasons. Later, the monarch-
omachy became a non-religious struggle against a hated form of
government. 7 Among the secular protagonists of the sovereignty of
the people and of an antimonarchistic form of government, Rous-
seau, who came from the reformed party, should be mentioned. In
his Contrat Social, the traditional state is contrasted with a society
that, on the basis of the sovereignty of the people, exercises all
governmental powers." Basically, a society founded under the Con-
trat Social is identical with the secularized church of the
Calvinists."
The Spiritualists, on the other hand, were not capable of
developing a concept of government, much less of creating a state,
because they denied the existence of an external church. Because of
this religious anarchism, they rejected all governmental organiza-
tions. The consequence of this negation of the social character of
man was that these movements were never able to establish them-
selves permanently. However, where anarchist and social theories
were combined, a strong new movement developed. This movement
66. F. Kern, Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht im frdhen Mittelalter,
in 1 MITTELALTERLICHE STUDIEN, H. 1, 145 (1914).
67. K. WOLZENDORFF, STAATSRECHT. UND NATURRECHT IN DER LEHRE VOM
WIDERSTANDSRECHT (1916). F. KERN, RECHT UND VERFASSUNG IM MrrTELALTER 106
(1952), rightly emphasizes that the right to resistance in the form of the monar-
chomachy, must be explained by the concept of law and government in the Middle
Ages.
68. J.J. ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL, Texte original publid avec introduc-
tion, notes et commentaire par Halbwachs, liv. II, chap. IV, p. 156 (1943). Rousseau,
who refers to the sovereign power "pouvoir souverain" as "absolu" and "tout sacra",
"tout inviolable", states that this power may not violate the "conventions gednrales"
(especially not the principle of equality): " . . . ne passe ni ne peut passer les bornes
des conventions gdndrales, et que tout homme peut disposer pleinement de ce quil lui
a td laisad de sea biens et de sa libertd par ces conventions."
69. F. GLUM, JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, RELIGION UND STAAT (1956).
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began as religious socialism and branched into several movements:
communism, social anarchism and socialism.
Stahl appropriately recognized the main characteristic of
socialism by referring to socialism and communism as social struc-
tures of conscience." The concept of freedom of conscience found its
strongest and most radical advocates in the Spiritualists and reli-
gious anarchists. 1 Conscience itself, however, stood against the
anarchistic and isolating effect of this radical idea of freedom. The
social tendency of human nature which enables man to create soci-
eties is better expressed by the Lutheran concept of a conscience of
freedom.
CONCLUSION
What does this renaissance of Martin Luther's legal concepts
and jurisprudence signify in today's situation? The posing of polar
alternatives -pious obedience to the state or religious anar-
chism- has been acknowledged as the result of an historical misin-
terpretation of Lutheran jurisprudence; it is not the consequence of
a Lutheran dialectic. Hans Karl Scherzer argues, "It has been a
symptom of the failure of the Lutheran social theology to under-
stand the complex concept of the Reformator and to develop a gen-
uine Lutheran political ethics."' The scholarship after World War I
that is the Luther renaissance developed so-called Lutheran
theologies which glorified autonomous secular orders such as state,
people or race. However, neither Luther nor his theory of two king-
doms can be blamed for this. Luther based his doctrine less on law
itself than on the freedom to develop law. This is clearly expressed
in the emphasis on the concept of conscience of freedom versus
freedom of conscience. A law based on this awareness is a Christian-
personal law and is closer to the right to give and receive brotherly
love (Ndchstenrecht or Liebesgebot) than to a law based on com-
mand and coercion (Befehl and Zwang). Such a Christian and per-
sonal law is the basis of neither an uncritical, pious, state-oriented
70. Stahl, DIE GEGENWARTIGEN PARTEIEN, in STAAT UND KIRCHE 1850/51 (1863).
Noted by T. RAMM, DIE GROBEN SOZIALISTEN ALS RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHEN 4
(1954). Supposedly characteristic of socialism is the acknowledgement of conscience as
the highest goal and measure, and the negation of God. H. VOLZ, CHRISTENTUM UND
POSITIVISMus, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER RECHTS-UND STAATSAUFFASSUNG STAHLS (1951).
ENGELS, 3 HERRN EUGEN DOHRINGS UMWALZUNG DER WISSENSCHAFT 348 (1956).
71. The successors of this "anarchistic Spiritualism" expressed this idea in the
following manner: "Je ne veux dtre ni gouvernant ni gouvernd." F. MUCKLE, DIE
GESCHICHTE DER SOZIALISTISCHEN IDEEN IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT, 1909, II 21.
72. Scherzer, Luther, in KLASSIKER DES POLITISCHEN DENKENS I 254 n.27 (1968).
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obedience, nor an anarchism based on religion. The fact that this
position was not understood, and that the problem was reduced to
the false dichotomy of obedience or anarchy, marked the beginning
of tragic developments in Germany.
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